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THE SOCIAL ROLE OF MILITARY AND POLICE








Fulfilling expectations is the shortest definition of any institution’s role in society, and the
same applies to the military and police. It means dealing with pressing problems. The pressing
problems of the 21st century are perennial problems, but now those threats are our own
created monsters: terrorism, which has almost replaced the conventional type of warfare;
the international organized crime, whose leaders were created by different “special needs”
of particular governments, and later used the tax-payers’ money to built their own underworld
empires; and environmental destruction, which is turning into destruction of life on Earth.
These are just some of many problems and threats to the world’s future which must be
solved, and the key institutions which will be able to neutralize those threats are the military
and police.
Making and presenting the government’s decisions about using the military and police to
neutralize those threats, and making them acceptable to others (to the citizens who have
empowered them; to the strategic partners) will not be possible by using the same way of
thinking which produced those threats in the past.
To neutralize future threats to human beings, social institutions – especially the military and
police, as well as governments – must switch from the traditional (hard) use of power, aimed
at achieving special (selfish) interests, to the “soft” use of power, aimed at creating the
common good.
Keywords: social institutions, military, police, global threats, use of power, soft use of power
instead of hard use of power, responsible and irresponsible strategic decisions
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INTRODUCTION
Fulfilling expectations means dealing with pressing problems. The pressing problems
of the 21st century are well known – they are threats to the survival of human
beings. Today those threats are our own created monsters.
Terrorism – organized use of violence against civilians aimed at achieving political
goals – has almost replaced the conventional type of warfare. It has got out of
control, perhaps as a result of the calculated evil of some politicians in the 1940s,
during the Cold War period, when terrorist activities carried out by friends of one
of the superpowers were supported as “fight for freedom”, or, alternatively, as
“fight for democracy”.
A similar kind of threat is the international organized crime. Many of its leaders
were created by different “special needs” of particular governments, and later used
the tax-payers’ money to build their own underworld empires.
As a result of the same way of thinking, environmental destruction and its
consequences are becoming a serious threat to life on Earth. Manipulating life and
nature, which are intrinsically not under human control, and at the same time are
much important than human wishes for more money, more power and more success,
has been the chief reason for the systematic destruction of life on Earth.
These are just some of many similar problems and threats to the world’s future
which must be solved. The military and police are two institutions whose potentials
could be better used in future to prevent and neutralize some of those threats. Are
they ready for those challenges regarding their internal organization, their members’
and leaders’ level of education and way of thinking, in short, regarding their own
“subculture” or “corporate culture”?
What kind of change can members of the military and police make in order to
become prepared for participating in the making of strategic decisions that will lay
the groundwork for overcoming those problems and threats?
Another problem is the fact that the past behavior of the governments and
others who had most power in their hands is what has created these threats in the
first place.
Because the military and police are under the civil governments’ control, the
global success of their mission depends on those governments (the real people that
they are made of) and their ability to use the power and the money with which the
citizens have entrusted them wisely and responsibly in order to solve some very
serious problems.
Would it be possible to neutralize those threats using the same way of thinking
that has produced them in the first place? Surely not! Those threats have not been
created by themselves. They are the consequences of a political way of thinking
that has produced the “four big moral political liabilities of our time – hunger and
poverty in the third world, torture and continuous violations of human dignity in
autocratic regimes, increasing unemployment and disparities of social wealth in
Western industrial nations, and finally the self-destructive risks of the nuclear arms
race” (Habermas, 1991.:209).
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Finally, it is imperative to understand how the present decisions become acceptable
to others: to the citizens who have entrusted the decision makers with some very
serious duties and have empowered them to work for the common good; as well as
to the strategic partners who do not expect the joint activity to be based on selfish
and particular interests which can produce short-term solutions but which, in the
global sense, could deepen the problem even further.
This paper will provide answers to the following questions:
1. What is the role of the military and police in the globalized, civilian and
democratic world of the future? How can the military and police co-exist construc-
tively in a desirable civilian, democratic, globalized human society, offering mutual
support, a clear strategy of action, and behaving responsibly towards citizens?
Social institutions – especially the military and police, as well as governments –
should switch from the use of power aimed at destruction, repression and domination
to the use of power that will neutralize threats, alleviate the consequences of past
conflicts and destruction, and help raise the overall quality of life.
The traditional use of power means utilizing the instruments of power to maintain
authority, employing the economic and military power to achieve domination over
the citizens of a particular state and over other nations, or using those instruments
for fulfilling the expectations of particular interest groups at the expense of all
other citizens and of the environment. It may have been termed the “traditional”
use of power because it tends to be predominant.
On the other hand, there is the use of power aimed at creating the common
good, which presupposes the notion of ‘state’ as serving all citizens. This means
using power to build democracy and uphold human rights for all the citizens of a
particular state and of the world. It also means using the economic power to support
sustained growth, to improve the quality of life, and to preserve the global envi-
ronment. In this context, military and police skills and potentials are employed to
uphold those values. Finally, this means that the armed forces are used only to
neutralize direct threats against human lives and the common good.
Part One of this paper addresses these issues.
2. What should be the basis for strategic decision-making – especially regarding
those decisions that have to do with the use of the military and police – that will be
acceptable to other sections of society (at the state, national and global levels)?
The two ways of using power mentioned above are based on two ways of
strategic decision-making. The traditional use of power, in general, is based on
strategic decisions which care only about achieving political and economic purposes.
Because of their blatant disregard of the often irreparable consequences they have
for people’s lives and health, and for the environment, we can call those decisions
irresponsible strategic decisions. Generally speaking, any decisions which result in
human suffering in the name of materialistic and political interests can be described
as irresponsible decisions. Suffering of a certain number of people is acceptable
only if it prevents the suffering of a larger number of people, or if it refers to those
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responsible for past crimes. Sacrificing human lives in the name of materialistic and
political interests is in itself a crime.
On the other hand, strategic decisions can be guided by goals aimed at the
common good. They show consideration for people, their lives and health, their
human rights, and they are oriented towards building and upholding those values.
For this reason we can call them responsible strategic decisions.
Part Two deals with these issues.
PART ONE
Stabilization of military and police institutions in social
environment
The rise of institutions always depends on common goals, which can be very different
and basically depend on recognizing the same, or similar, needs and interests. At
the beginning, recognizing common problems is sufficient for the definition of,
and agreement on, joint goals. The permanence of some common necessities requires
a long duration of similar actions, but for successful and lasting operations it becomes
more necessary than recognizing common problems. It is more than enough to
reinstate a stable arrangement of common rules or norms, which is possible in two
main ways, although they never appear in a pure form.
The first is habitualization. The process of habitualization supports stabilization
of mutual relationships between elements of an institution. “The processes of
habitualization precedes any institutionalization… Institutionalization occurs
whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.
Put differently any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed is the
reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but
also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute
institutions are always shared ones. They are available to all the members of the
particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors
as well as individual actions. nstitutions further imply historicity and control.
Reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared history.
Institutions always have a history of which they are the product. It is impossible to
understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical
process in which it was produced. They also by the very fact of their existence,
control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel
it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be
possible. In actual experience institutions generally manifest themselves in collectivities
containing considerable numbers of people” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:54).
The second is social contract, a concept developed by Thomas Hobbes. A social
contract is a solution when, once one has reached a contractual agreement with
another, he grants his approval to the obligations and the correlative rights that
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accrue to him and to his partner on the basis of this agreement. On the level of
social structure, individuals (status and roles) and groups who try to achieve similar
goals make efforts to find, for all of them, acceptable ways of mutual communication,
and ways of conducting mutual activities, because they make a contract about the
basis of their work: mutual relationships; useful instruments, and hierarchy of goals.
With time, arranged norms become obligatory in any individual case, and in
accordance with this, become indisputably the basis of any activities. Habitualization
and social contract are two essential conditions in the process of stabilizing institutions.
At same time the process of legitimation of institution toward outside social reality
continues: “The function of legitimation is to make objectively available and
subjectively plausible the ‘first order’ objectivations that have been institutionalized.
While we define legitimation by this function, regardless of the specific motives
inspiring any particular legitimating process, it should be added that ‘integration’
in one form or another, is also the typical purpose motivating the legitimators”
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:92).
“Legitimatization is not necessary in the first phase of institutionalization, when
the institution is simply an act that requires no further support either intersubjectively
or biographically; it is self-evident to all concerned. The problem of legitimation
inevitably arises when the objectivations of the new historic institutional order are
to be transmitted to a new genaration” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:93).
John Rawls (1999.) emphasizes justice as the first virtue of social institutions, as
truth is of systems of thought. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on
justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. Society is well
ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but
when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. That is, it is a
society in which
1. everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of
justice, and
2. the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy
these principles.
He also explains the well-ordered peoples’ right to war: “No state has a right to
war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests. The Law of
Peoples does, however, assign to all well-ordered peoples (both liberal and docent),
and indeed to any society that follows and honors a reasonably just Law of Peoples,
the right to war in self-defense. When a liberal society engages in war in self-
defense, it does so to protect and preserve the basic freedoms of its citizens and its
constitutionally democratic political institutions” (Rawls, 1999.:91).
The role of social institutions is to meet social needs. Sociologists define the role
in terms of expectations: groups of norms and values that individuals and institutions
must be able to achieve.
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• This world and its citizens need security: a life without war, without
terorrism, without crime, without poverty, and without threat of contami-
nated air, water, earth, flora and fauna;
• such a world may be built only with respect for the phenomena of life (this
has the highest value because it is irretrievable), mutual respect, dignity,
cooperation, a sense of justice and solidarity (economic, educational, cultural;
other institutions also have the role of caring about human needs);
• on the other hand, there always exists a need for more selfish success, more
power, more control and more manipulation of people and their property
(the military and police are institutions whose role is to prevent this).
Max Weber (1978.) studied the role of military services throughout human history
and compiled a list of services that this type of institution performs in the life of
society. “Discipline as the basis of warfare, gave birth to patriarchal kingship among
the Zulus, where the monarch, however, was constitutionally limited by the power
of the army commanders – similar to the (manner in which) the) Spartan (kings
were checked by the) ephors. Similarly, discipline gave birth to the Hellenic polis
with gymnasia. When infantry drill was perfected to the point of virtuosity (as in
Sparta), the polis had inevitably an aristocratic structure; when cities resorted to
naval discipline, they had a democratic structure (Athens). Military discipline was
also the basis of Swiss democracy, which in heyday of the Swiss mercenaries was
very different from the Athenian but controlled – in Greek terms – territories with
inhabitants of limited rights (perioeci) or with no rights (helots). Military discipline
was also instrumental in establishing the rule of the Roman patriciate and, finally,
the bureaucratic states of Egypt, Assyria and modern Europe. (Weber, 1978.:1152)…
The well-trained Spartan Army, the organization of the other Hellenic and
Macedonian and of several Oriental military establishments, the Turkish quasi–
prebendal fiefs, and finally the feudal fiefs of the Japanese and Occidental Middle
Ages – all of these were stages of the economic decentralization which usually goes
hand in hand with the weakening of discipline and the rise of individual heroism.
From the disciplinary aspect, just as from the economic, the seigneurial vassal
represents an extreme contrast to the patronomial or bureaucratic soldier. And the
disciplinary aspect, is a consequence of the economic aspect… Military discipline
gives birth to all discipline” (Weber, 1978.:1154)
In this capacity the institutionalization of military and police serves society. Always,
in any past or future cases, the first and main role of these types of institutions is
providing safety to other people. Problems exist and will probably always exist about
different interpretations regarding the instruments this role includes, and what
circumstances must exist for complete moral justification of the use of force in
protecting people without arms and without bad intentions, against individuals
and groups with arms and with bad intentions.
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The role of military and police services (institutions) in the
global, civilian and democratic world of the future
We now turn to the ways in which the military and police can constructively co-exist
in a civilian, democratic and global human society: offering mutual support, a clear
strategy of action, and behaving responsibly towards citizens.
As we have said, social institutions are structured answers to basic needs of
human society. They originate, develop, and live as long they present the best way
to solving real social problems, or as long those problems exist in social environment.
Some needs, such as individual and social need for safety, have never changed,
and so we are witnesses of continually developing ways in which human societies
respond to the many threats to human existence. During the history of civilization,
the military and police institutions have changed their shape (their level and forms
of organization), but they have existed in every society, regardless of its level of
development. After states broke up or regimes changed, the first institutions that
arose faster than others were, usually or very often, those two.
The reason for the changes in the military and police institutions has been the
loss of orientation of action, but never the purpose of their existence. When they
became instruments of conquest instead of defense; instruments of violence instead
of keeping the peace; instruments used against the citizens (within a state or outside
of it) instead of protecting their rights, stability and safety, they either broke down
or changed, sometimes immediately, sometimes after a number of years, but they
invariably did.
Today, at the beginning of a new millennium, the purpose of their existence is
changing: threats are becoming different, the environment is becoming different
and, consequently, the military and police must follow the rhythm of those changes.
The processes of globalization have transformed the ways of living and ways of
thinking. Particular goals, interests and responsibilities, those of particular states or
countries, have ceased to exist whether they want it or not, and common goals,
interests and responsibilities have taken over.
We are witnesses that the processes of globalization in many cases have their
own laws and do not depend on people’s wishes. Interestingly, threats spread
faster than the opportunities and resources for neutralizing them: global terrorism
almost has replaced the conventional warfare among states; the international
organized crime (gun-running, drug-and human trafficking) has prevailed instead
of the usual types of crime; and environmental destruction has taken the shape of
destruction of life on Earth. Sometimes it seems that the “institutions” of the world
crime are becoming global faster and easier than the institutions that must stop
them.
The common interests of neutralizing threats to the present and future require
only one goal: building institutions, both military and police, that would be able to
protect global safety. It means life without terrorism, without war, without crime,
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without poverty created by injustice, and without ecological catastrophes caused
by a blind wish for more profit.
How can those institutions meet this challenge? It seems logical and obvious that
neutralizing the threats to the world’s citizens will require institutions that are not
limited by state borders, but are able to solve global problems. In these new circum-
stances, the classic concept of national (state) armed forces would not able to neutralize
global threats. The right answer to those problems must also be global. This means
that the military and police institutions have to transform themselves as soon as possible,
not only to become more civilian and democratic, but also more globalized.
 Among the contemporary papers focusing on relationships between military
services and society, an important study is “The Armed forces and Society” by Timothy
Edmunds, Anthony Forster and Andrew Cottey (2002.), who provide a survey of
recent literature on this subject, citing Martin Edmonds, James Gow, Christopher
Dandeker, Charles Moskos, Frank Wood and Martin Shaw.
Edmonds suggests that the nature of the military’s task – where personnel are
expected to have ‘unlimited liability’ and the prospect of being killed is almost a
‘definitional’ aspect of service – does make it different from other institutions in
society such as the police or the civil-service. These tasks, he argues, necessitate the
transfer of individual values to those of the group, and require the maintenance of
particularly high levels of moral and discipline. As a result, Edmonds suggests that
the ‘armed services fulfil a highly specialized function, the effect of which is to
separate them entirely, and geographically to a great extent, from civil society’.
Gow takes a different approach, identifying legitimacy as the key element in the
relationship between the military and society. Gow argues that military legitimacy
has both functional and socio-political bases. The functional basis of military legiti-
macy derives from its ‘military mission’ – which he defines as the protection of the
state from external threat. The socio-political bases of military legitimacy are more
complex, and stem from the nature of the military’s relationship with political au-
thority, its role as a symbol of political unity and national pride (informed by military
traditions and past military activities), its contribution to the socio-economic infra-
structure of the state, and its role as an instrument of education and socialisation.
This military legitimacy is the basis of a ‘social contract’ between soldiers and the
socio-political community, and for Gow, ‘support [for the military] will be forthcoming
if [it] performs effectively, in accordance with its functional and socio-political bases
of legitimacy, or if there is some attachment to those bases that overarch poor
performance’.
Christopher Dandeker notes that while the armed forces share ‘institutional
qualities’ – such as the need for teamwork, leadership and loyalty to the organisation
– with other civilian organisations, their war-fighting role necessitates a level of
coercion in military discipline which sets them apart. Thus, he observes that ‘the
functional imperative of war ensures that the military will always stand apart from
civilian society’. Dandeker also addresses the second military and society debate. He
observes that despite the demands of the military’s functional imperative, a series
of challenges have emerged to military culture and its ‘right to be different’ which
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amount to ‘new times’ for the military. These include, first, a changed strategic
context – which in the west entails an end to immediate threats to national security
and a more ‘globalised’ world where challenges to state sovereignty have come
from both above from supranational organisations and below from regionalism
and a globalisation of social and cultural relationships. Second, a changed societal
context in which the supporting framework for core military values is increasingly
challenged by a more individualistic, egalitarian and litigious society. Finally and
partly as a result of the changed strategic context, increasing cost pressures which
have led to the civilianisation of many traditionally military jobs such as logistical
support. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood have suggested that that societal pressures
are leading western militaries to shift from an institutional structure to a more
civilianised organizational one. Moskos et al argue that these changes are significant
enough to be considered a new, postmodern phase of military organisation and
military-society relations. For them, the postmodern military is characterised by an
increasing interpenetrability between civilian and military spheres; a diminution of
differences within the military itself, particularly between different ranks and services;
non-traditional military operations such as peacekeeping; the increasing importance
and prevalence of supranational or multinational command structures or at least
legitimation for military operations; the internationalisation of the military them-
selves. Martin Shaw argues his twin conceptions of post-military and common risk
society. For Shaw, the Cold War period in much of the industrialised world was
characterized by the militarisation of society through the necessity for mass armies
and conscriptions. Moreover, in many states such as France, this militarisation was
reinforced by a conception of society which emphasised a contract between the
state and its citizens. Thus, in return for their rights, citizens were expected to
provide service to the state through conscription. Shaw argues that geopolitical
changes coupled with economic growth and a revolution of rising expectations are
increasingly undermining this militarisation leading to a post-military society where
military service and experience are the exception rather than the norm. Shaw has
refined this theme, arguing that the militarisation along national lines so chara-
cteristic of the Cold War period has been replaced by a common risk society, in
which perceptions of threat from problems such as global warming are perceived
to be increasingly transnational. In conjunction with the changes associated with
the post-military society, this shift of perception has resulted in the replacement of
traditional military symbols and places in national cultures with spectator sport mili-
tarism, where societal engagement with the military is limited to passive observance
through the media.
The building this type of institution requires deep deliberation about the basic idea
of serving common interests, based on unconditional respect for human life and
dignity as irretrievable values; on the other hand, it means avoiding inhibited factors
as particular, special and, with increasing frequency, states’ interests.
On the strategic level of concrete activity, it requires changes in the use of power
in social institutions (especially military, police and governments) from the traditional
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use of power to achieve special (selfish) interests, to the use of power to create the
common good for the citizens. There are many examples (from ancient to recent
history) that would show that the traditional use of power for achieving particular
interests becomes dissipation of energy, and finally makes existing problems even
worse. Just several very tragic examples: the indulgence of Adolph Hitler, Mohamed
Farrah Adeed, or Slobodan Miloševiæ as a result of some powerful politicians and
governments behaving with short-term and short-range interests in mind at the
beginning, which created an irrevocable tragedy afterwards.
The conclusion is that tolerating and allowing the violation of basic principles of
humanity and democracy always leads to a complete loss of control subsequently,
which has proved to be a social and historical fact. The only logical solution is to
create institutions that would be able to operate on the same rules and principles
to prevent any individual case, anywhere.
Some such institutions already exist, but their activities could be improved to
support particular states, interest groups and individuals.
The role of what could be described as a common government could be built on
the idea of the United Nations if all the states concerned invested more of their
own instruments of power and sovereignty in such a joint governing body. Those
decisions would be possible if they were based on free will and a clear vision about
the benefits that would result from such a move. Only then would the UN be able
to direct the joint power to improve our co-existence.
NATO is an organization which comes close to this way of thinking and operating.
But the necessary level for overcoming the global threats is hindered by the
organization’s particular and isolated interests. In NATO’s case, the lack of vision
and the orientation towards particular states’ interests is not associated with military
professionals, but with political decision makers. For example, in the case of Bosnia
and Kosovo in the 1990s, decisions on the type of engagement hinged on political
compromises. Again and again, mixing political interests with expert knowledge
creates results which are bad, or at least not good enough. However, NATO has the
capacity to become an institution capable of bringing together the skills and
knowledge necessary for using joint power to neutralize threats and protect the
common good. The focus of NATO’s future use or, more generally, of the ways of
using power, depends on strategic decisions. It depends on the decision makers,
their visions and interests.
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PART TWO
What should be the basis for strategic decisions: especially
those regarding the use of the military and police force, that
will be acceptable to other sections of society (at the state,
national and global levels)?
The first line of battle for neutralizing and stopping the threats we have mentioned
belongs to the military and police (each of them, in society, has a special area of
action), but what they will do and what type of action will be used depends on
political decisions. Because threats are global, action must be global, too. Many of
these threats, directly or indirectly, are a result of earlier political decisions that have
been made without adequate consideration about the consequences. Most such
decisions have been described and analyzed by political scientists and experts on
history (Kissinger, 1994. and 1999.). The level of responsibility can be assigned
according to the level of power and the degree of advancement of the basic
principles of liberal democracy.
World citizens (regardless of their local circumstances, whether they live in liberal
democracy or not) expect global threats to be defeated. Is this possible, and how?
The most responsible institutions are those which have the duty and the means for
making strategic decisions for other institutions and segments of society (govern-
ments, parliaments and heads of states).
Those institutions have power in their hands and only two ways of making
decisions on how to use it (which can be assessed in light of the consequences):
responsibly or irresponsibly; and only two main goals: to realize common interests
or to realize some other (special, particular, selfish…) interests. What actual combi-
nations of these extreme alternatives can be observed in everyday life?
The orientation for achieving common interests is usually connected with the
responsible decisions. As we said at the beginning, common interests are produced
by real social needs, and the first step is to recognize them. They could have existed
since a long time ago as a result of natural individual needs, but many of them exist
(completely or partially) as a result of prior traditional use of power guided by
irresponsible decisions, and present very serious problems, such as the threats we
stressed earlier. They need to be solved faster than the others, because their existence
jeopardizes people’s lives and society in general. In any case, the government has to
work to recognize common interests, establish congruent goals, seriously consider
the ways and means to achieve them, deliberate every possible consequence, make
decisions with acceptable consequences, and finally present and explain the decisions
to its citizens (and strategic partners, if they need them, usually on an international
level of action) requiring their support. This is a responsible way of making decisions,
and, importantly, the outcome is positive and usually does not continue to exist as
a new problem or threat. In reality, there are many individual examples of this way
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of thinking and acting, but in very few cases is it possible to give credit to the whole
government.
The orientation for achieving some other (ideological, special, particular or selfish)
interests usually goes hand in hand with irresponsible strategic decisions. This refers
to decisions and actions that take into account not the real social needs, but rather
the interests that they wish to achieve, regardless of real problems and threats to
people’s lives and society in general. Explicitly it means avoiding social role and
duties, and it always tricks citizens and fails their legitimate expectations. Usually
the actors try to present their goals as common to all citizens. The results and
consequences of this way of governing are distressing, and a lot of time is needed
for healing society: to reverse the consequences and set in order the interior and
exterior conditions, and finally for a revival of trust in the possibility of existence of
democratic rules. This orientation can be associated with particular individuals in
power, but the likelihood that a complete administration might resort to it is usually
restricted to fundamentally undemocratic regimes.
In the real world today, there are governments whose terms in office are marked by
responsible and altruistic, as well as irresponsible, egoistic, or even criminal decisions
at the same time. The deal of liberal democracy overcomes this latter way of thinking
and behavior. There are two fundamental conditions that must be realized at a very
high level, which can counteract any undemocratic influence. The first, most
frequently mentioned notion is human rights. Blandine Kriegel (1995.:34) believes
that three conditions are necessary for a doctrine of human rights. First, the human
being as such must be recognized as a having value. Second, this recognition must
be given legal expression. Finally, this legal status must be guaranteed by political
authorities. The next most important concept is the rule of law among persons and
among peoples. John Rawls (1999.:37) cites several authors who made lists similar to
the principles of international law: peoples are free and independent, and their
freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples; peoples are to
observe treaties and undertakings; peoples are equal and are parties to the
agreements that bind them; peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention;
peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons
other than self-defense; peoples are to honor human rights; peoples are to observe
certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war; peoples have a duty to assist
other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just
or decent political and social regime.
In short, if any decisions, especially strategic ones, are based on the rule of law
and show respect for the human rights of all those persons that will bear the
consequences of these decisions, there is a strong possibility that the results will be
far-reaching and positive. On the contrary, making decisions without respect for
human rights and the rule of law will always produce bad consequences, which
creates new problems and threats, with their own unpredictable laws.
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On what does the quality, duration, and legitimacy of strategic
decisions depend?
Considering the decision-making process, especially regarding those decisions
governing the organized types of social activities, we can identify three kinds of
logic, that is, three kinds of interests that go into the creation of strategic decisions.
These three kinds of logic are bureaucratic, political and expert, since every level of
strategic decision making (within a state, at the state level and at the international
level) includes those three groups of people, and those three ways of thinking.
Each one of them has a very important role, but problems emerge if any of them
pretends to play the key role in the decision-making process.
Bureaucratic logic is based on misgivings about any changes, especially those
done quickly, and bureaucratic vision is always based on tradition. Usually, tradition
is the main reason and has the advantage of critical consideration about usefulness
or purposefulness. Political logic is usually guided by political success, which must
be evident, quick and useful in increasing the popularity of a particular political
party. This kind of purpose is usually the main reason in the reaching of decisions.
Expert logic is based on empirical validity. It includes all established information
connected with a certain problem. This logic tries to discover the roots, because
they are the best answers about the nature of the problem. Serious consideration
about all possible predictable consequences is a very important part of expert decision-
making. The problem with this way of thinking is usually connected with yielding in
duels with political and administrational authorities on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, with their feeling of superiority, which often causes them to ignore
some very serious common problems.
The best (ideal) decisions start when the persons chosen by citizens in elections
– the politicians – recognize real social needs and problems, and prioritize them
with the help of experts (depending on the kind of threat and the predictable
bad consequences that can arise if the threat is ignored). Experts then suggest
solutions, means, and all possible ways for solving the problem, and list all
predictable consequences. The bureaucratic segment takes care of supporting
them by background (literature, similar cases in tradition), public feedback, and
whether the measures considered usually work, most importantly regarding the
normal administration and state life. At the same time, every proposal is checked
in light of human rights and the rule of law. The final decision is a result of a
concerted effort, and enjoys strong support by non-governmental agencies, which
are involved to offer special advice on human rights. If the presentation of the
decision and the request for support of the citizens and all interested parties (the
international partners, organizations and citizens) includes illustrating the whole
decision-making process with all the efforts it involved, universal support is almost
guaranteed.
Which influence was greater than necessary is usually clear from the consequences.
As we have said, responsible decisions are recognized as being long-term, right,
legitimate and enjoying the support of the citizens. If those qualities are lacking,
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there is not much chance for fixing the situation, because the bad consequences
have already created even more serious problems.
This is still the main approach. Although most world leaders pledge to uphold
the principles of liberal democracy (human rights and the rule of law), their concrete
decisions are still based on a very primitive use of power. The reasons for it are
obvious. Depending on power always means and requires an investment in power.
Standing by those principles is very expensive. If a lot of money and reputations are
invested in a certain decision, or a number of decisions, which then prove to have
been erroneous, admitting this fact would be very difficult and risky. A more
convenient solution is to bend the facts to suit the current situation. This means
persistently defending the wrong way, with more and more deposits of power and
money. Politics that are based on this kind of idea can bring together many clever
and educated people in order to explain and exculpate a certain orientation, who
would create political theories based on twisted truths. It can even become a
dominant way of political thinking and educate many generations of political thinkers.
They can even create the public opinion that this is the only real strategy in global
politics. It is possible to defend any policy by using force, but this policy, if it is based
on irresponsible decisions, always produces injustice, violence and new threats. With
time it creates a critical amount of displeasure and animosity, and breaks down, but
unfortunately bad consequences remain. They are often irreparable or require a lot
of good will and sacrifice to be rectified.
How is it possible to continue doing the wrong thing when all facts that argue
to the contrary are so evident? Does anyone strongly believe that the same way of
thinking that has caused many of today’s and future threats in the first place can
now create the right solutions for neutralizing them?
“Policymakers are forever tempted to wait for a case to arise before dealing with
it; manipulation replaces reflection as the principal policy tool. But the dilemmas of
foreign policy are not only – or perhaps even primarily – the by-product of contem-
porary events; rather they are the end-product of the historical process that shaped
them. Modern decision making is overwhelmed not only by contemporary facts but
by the immediate echo which overwhelms perspective. Instant punditry and the
egalitarian conception that any view is as valid as any other combine with a cascade
of immediate symptoms to crush a sense of perspective” (Kissinger, 1999.:1075).
CONCLUSION
As we have pointed out, no threat has ever proved to be as globally dangerous as
are today’s threats, because the world has never been so “small” before. Things are
now so closely connected that any incident that happens anywhere in the world
leads to dramatic effects somewhere else. This fact has resulted in many tragic
decisions and, consequently, actions. In the past few years, circumstances have
changed drastically, with every unconsidered decision backfiring immediately,
especially on the strategic (governmental) level.
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Throughout the known history, power has belonged to groups and peoples
who had control over resources and weapons. Under these circumstances, the
general opinion was that the responsibility for peace and global stability rested
with very few states. This was until a handful of unidentified persons made a decision
which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people in the WTC and in the long
term affected the world’s several billion citizens. That moment showed the
weaknesses of the world order based on the balance of power and fear among the
few superpowers or, recently, on the economic interests of only one superpower. It
has obviously demonstrated the failure of the traditional use of power and of
irresponsible strategic decisions.
Nevertheless, there is one indisputable fact: great power always goes hand in
hand with great responsibility. The responsibility for the quality of strategic decisions
on how to use power still rests with the few leaders of the most powerful states.
But at the same time, the globalization of democratic ideas and the spreading of
critical opinions among the citizens has created a social atmosphere in which
responsibility becomes not only the leaders’ desirable characteristic, but also their
duty and obligation. In the end, the neutralization of global threats depends on
their decision to take joint global action. Through such institutions as the UN and
NATO, this action could be institutionalized and channeled into regular activities
and become a generally accepted approach to solving common problems in our
common world of the future.
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VOJSKA I POLICIJA KAO DRUŠTVENE INSTITUCIJE I
NJIHOVA ULOGA U 21. STOLJEÆU
Renato Matiæ
Sa<etak
Ispuniti društvena oèekivanja – najkraæe je objašnjenje uloge bilo koje društvene institucije.
Ispuniti oèekivanja znaèi uspješno riješiti društvene probleme i otkloniti društvene prijetnje.
Najveæe prijetnje na poèetku 21. stoljeæa prijetnje su opstanku ljudi i <ivotu na planetu.
Veæina tih prijetnji “èudovišta” su koja smo mi, ljudi stvorili: terorizam je preuzeo ulogu ne
samo klasiènom ratovanju veæ gotovo svakom dijalogu; meðunarodni organizirani kriminal,
èiji su lideri vrlo èesto bili usko povezani s nacionalnim vladama, da bi poslije novcem
opljaèkanim od graðana stvarali svoja podzemna carstva; uništenje okoliša, koje polako ali
sigurno postaje uništenje <ivota na Zemlji.
To su samo neki od prisutnih problema i prijetnji na koje globalno društvo mora uspješno
odgovoriti. Meðu glavne institucije od kojih se oèekuje neutralizacija prijetnji svakako
pripadaju policijske i vojne snage.
Odluke pojedinih vlada dr<ava o uporabi oru<anih snaga za postizanje zajednièkih ciljeva,
trebaju biti prihvatljive i razumljive vlastitim graðanima, kao i strateškim partenerima. Stoga
više nije moguæe koristiti onu logiku koja je u prošlosti prouzroèila najveæe prijetnje današnjice.
Da bi se uporabom vojnih i policijskih snaga uspješno neutralizirale prijetnje èovjeèanstvu
i <ivotu uopæe, potrebno je prekinuti s tradicionalnim razmišljanjem o sili koja slu<i
zastrašivanju drugih i postizanju posebnih, uglavnom sebiènih interesa, a zapoèeti s
uporabom potencijala za ostvarenje zajednièkih ciljeva tj. opæeg dobra.
Kljuène rijeèi: društvene institucije, vojska, policija, globalne prijetnje, primijena sile, primijena
sile za pomoæ, primijena sile za razaranje, odgovorne i neodgovorne strateške odluke
